The snippet was still theirs. Allowlisting cdn.optimizely.com is not the CSP.
On 16 November an unauthorized party wrote a loader into Optimizely Web Project JavaScript. Report URI found it in 188 of 1,611 snippets across 178 organisations, including Zoom, the BBC, CNN, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC and Equifax. The file still came from cdn.optimizely.com. Optimizely, 17 November 01:02 UTC, says it fixed a vulnerability in Experimentation, removed the code, and notified affected customers. There is no CVE. Cleaning Project JS is not the Content-Security-Policy.
Bottom line up front
CONFIRMED On 16 November 2026 an unauthorized party wrote a short loader into Optimizely Web Experimentation Project JavaScript. The rest of each customer snippet was untouched. The file was still served from cdn.optimizely.com, with Optimizely’s certificate, from a host every affected site already trusted. Report URI (Scott Helme) fetched 1,611 distinct snippets and found the loader in 188, belonging to 178 organisations. Named examples include Zoom, the BBC, CNN, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Air France-KLM, Ledger and Peacock. First observed injection: 04:21 UTC on the BBC snippet. Mass clean-up from about 20:40 UTC. Report URI: all 188 were clean by 23:11 UTC and stayed clean.
Optimizely’s status incident ftw0fh9wx43z, posted 17 November 01:02 UTC (after yesterday’s 06:00 ET Daily Top), says an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in Experimentation, added malicious JavaScript to some customer projects, fixed the vulnerability, removed the injected code, secured affected user accounts, and put additional protections in place to stop unauthorized code being delivered. To BleepingComputer the vendor placed the hole in the Experimentation account signup flow, said it ended sessions, revoked tokens, reset access, blocked further code delivery in Cloudflare, and notified all affected customers. There is no CVE. Live CISA catalog this run is still 2026.11.13 / 1781.
Do not collapse five facts.
- This is not a CDN cache poison, and it is not a compromise of Zoom’s or the BBC’s origin. Report URI: Optimizely’s CDN served exactly what the project contained. First-party application code did not have to change. Allowlisting
cdn.optimizely.cominscript-srcwas the trust decision the attacker used, not a control. - A clean Project JS field is not the visitor incident. Cards typed into first-party form fields, non-
HttpOnlycookies, clipboard crypto addresses, and older iPhones that hit an infected page on the 16th are a browser problem. Hosted payment iframes (Stripe, Adyen and similar) were out of the skimmer’s reach. Report URI cannot see how many cards or cookies reached the collector. On-chain receipts to the kit’s wallets are about $7,150 as of the 17 November 09:17 UTC update — not a loss census, and the TRON wallet has been in use since March 2026. - No iPhone takeover is confirmed. The kit loaded Coruna (iOS 13–17) and DarkSword (iOS 18.x) in hidden iframes and fingerprinted iOS 26. Report URI’s kit comments say 18.7.3+ and 26.3+ are patched. Secondary reporting: no iPhones actually taken over. Treat delivery as CONFIRMED; successful implant as UNKNOWN.
- This is not [yesterday’s LiteLLM hunt](/posts/2026-11-16-amazon-madpot-artex-litellm-keys/), not Barracuda’s ARTEX cloud IR, and not [N-central HF3](/posts/2026-11-13-ncentral-4everable2shell-hotfix2/). Amazon’s MadPot records were internet-exposed AI gateways. Barracuda’s 1–2 November intrusion was an unretired vendor cloud key. N-able shipped 2026.4.1.39 (HF3) on the 16th with CVE-2026-129271 through CVE-2026-129287. Three other tickets. A Magecart loader in Project JS is none of them.
- The earlier Kissmetrics / StorifyMe / Minute Media injector is the same actor, not this product. Report URI ties
webshell.lolon 13–16 November to those scripts, and the same wallets to cash-outs in March and on 3 November. Do not brief that Optimizely was those sites, and do not invent an APT name.
The operator sentence: if you load Optimizely Web, open every project’s Project JavaScript and every experiment’s custom code today, rotate Optimizely users and tokens, treat 16 November first-party card fields and non-HttpOnly cookies as exposed, and put a CSP on that does not bless every script the snippet inserts. A missing vendor email is not a green row. Yesterday’s LiteLLM inventory is a different ticket.
What happened
17 November 2026, after yesterday’s 06:00 ET Daily Top. Yesterday’s live catalog was 2026.11.13 / 1781. It still is. CISA added nothing overnight. Yesterday’s Daily Top was [Amazon MadPot’s ARTEX-agent playbook against internet-exposed LiteLLM, Dify and One API](/posts/2026-11-16-amazon-madpot-artex-litellm-keys/). The increment for this run is Report URI’s 16 November analysis (published after that 06:00 ET run), Optimizely’s 01:02 UTC status note, and the vendor statement to BleepingComputer.
Report URI’s picture, paraphrased, not a reproduction:
- Optimizely Web customers load a snippet from
cdn.optimizely.com(or a first-party alias such asopt.scheels.com/www.vodafone.com.au). Inside it: Optimizely’s code, experiments, and optional Project JavaScript that runs on every page. - The attacker wrote a loader into that field. Three shapes: a plain script tag to
https://1688360.cc/track.js; the same URL behindatob(); an inline copy that runs throughevalif the remote host is blocked. Smartsheet was cleaned and then re-infected with the base64 variant, so write access was still live at that point. track.jswas rebuilt 26 times during the day. It swapped checksum-valid wallet addresses (BTC, ETH/EVM, TRON, Solana, TON, Litecoin, BCH, Dogecoin) in page text, forms, clipboard,fetch/XHR,window.openand the iOS share sheet; from 13:43 UTC it Luhn-checked card number + expiry + CVV on form posts and first-partyfetchand beaconed them tocard.php; on a swap next to wallet/payment wording it sent URL, non-HttpOnlycookies, original addresses and an html2canvas screenshot tohit.php; on iPhone/iPad it loadedboot.jsfrom two.icurouters.- Optimizely’s own
www.optimizely.comandlogin.optimizely.comsnippets carried the code. Report URI does not know how one actor obtained write access across unrelated projects — compromised Optimizely system, a credential with cross-customer write, or something else. That is for the vendor.
Optimizely has not published a CVE, a customer count, or a technical root-cause beyond “signup flow.” Salesforce told BleepingComputer it is disabling Optimizely scripts on preview and production as a precaution and will notify if it finds unauthorized access to customer data. Equifax, in secondary reporting, said it investigated, stopped using Optimizely, and did not find evidence of a compromise of its systems. Those are vendor statements, not a census.
Not this increment as a reprint. N-central HF3 (build 2026.4.1.39, 16 November) permanently blocks Legacy API and requires every Agent and Probe upgraded or they can be impersonated — material on the [13 November 4EverAble2Shell](/posts/2026-11-13-ncentral-4everable2shell-hotfix2/) ticket, not this snippet. Barracuda’s CISO post (11 November; BleepingComputer 16 November 14:57 ET) is an ARTEX-shaped walk of about 10 cloud accounts in 44 hours off an unretired AI-vendor key — sequenced under yesterday’s FLASH, not this CDN. Google’s 16 November GTIG tracker (exploit_agent, patch-diffing) is a class paper. [Check Point CVE-2026-123039](/posts/2026-11-14-checkpoint-cve-2026-123039-kev/) and UnrealIRCd CVE-2026-114713 were due yesterday; catalog unchanged. SonicWall CVE-2026-19868 is due 20 November.
Why it matters
Three operational reasons this is the daily.
First: the false close is “we trust our tag manager.” The origin was never the BBC’s. The certificate was never the attacker’s. CSP that allowlists the experimentation CDN, or uses 'strict-dynamic' so anything the snippet inserts is trusted, or follows Optimizely’s own docs into 'unsafe-eval', is how the loader ran. Report URI crawled 256 affected organisation hosts: 68 had no CSP; 50 allowed both payload and exfil; 17 ran the payload but connect-src blocked the collector (address swapping still worked); 24 (15%) blocked the payload. HSBC’s CSP blocked track.js and the beacon; the inline copy still ran through eval.
Second: Project JavaScript is a remote code pipe with the production origin’s privileges. It is the Magecart analogue of last week’s RMM console: a trusted admin surface that executes in every visitor browser. Rotating Optimizely passwords after the vendor “secured accounts” does not tell you which first-party card fields were posted on the 16th, or which session cookies were not HttpOnly.
Third: industrial and OT brand names on the victim list are marketing sites until someone shows a controller. Report URI’s sector table includes Fluke, Vaillant, Resideo / Honeywell Home, myQ / Chamberlain, First Alert. That is visitor-browser malware on a public web property. It is not confirmed OT or ICS process impact, and it is not a refrigeration-controller story. Do not import the [cold-chain](/posts/2026-11-06-cisa-cold-chain-refrigeration/) desk.
Who / what is affected
| Asset | What the sources say | Floor / action | Who should care first |
|---|---|---|---|
Optimizely Web projects (snippet from cdn.optimizely.com or a first-party alias) | Report URI: 188/1,611 snippets, 178 orgs; vendor: some customer projects, all affected customers notified | Open Project JS and experiment custom code; rotate users, API tokens, SSO; assume write access until the vendor’s RCA | CISO / web / AppSec |
| First-party card fields on 16 Nov (not Stripe/Adyen iframes) | Skimmer from 13:43 UTC; collector volume UNKNOWN | Treat those PAN/expiry/CVV as potentially exposed; issuer watch | Payments / PCI |
Non-HttpOnly cookies, clipboard crypto | hit.php + address swap; on-chain ~$7,150 is not the cookie census | Rotate session tokens; tell visitors who copied wallet addresses on the 16th to verify the paste | Identity / fraud |
| iPhone / iPad on iOS 18.6 or earlier (and 13–17) that hit an infected page | Coruna / DarkSword iframes; 60-second reload tell; no confirmed implant | Update to 18.7.3+ or 26.3+; do not treat a visit as a confirmed compromise | Mobile / helpdesk |
| Salesforce properties that loaded Optimizely | Salesforce: scripts disabled on preview and production pending investigation | Follow Salesforce; do not wait for a public customer-data finding | Salesforce web owners |
| N-central on-prem / Agents / Probes | HF3 2026.4.1.39; Legacy API permanently blocked; un-upgraded Agent/Probe can be impersonated | Upgrade server and every Agent/Probe; Inactive Assets tab after reconnect | MSP / [13 Nov ticket](/posts/2026-11-13-ncentral-4everable2shell-hotfix2/) — not this snippet |
| Barracuda cloud / XDR integration keys | 1–2 Nov ARTEX-shaped run; vendor contacted potentially affected XDR customers | If Barracuda asked you to recreate integrations, that is still open; silence means they say no action | [ESG KEV](/posts/2026-11-11-barracuda-esg-kev/) queue, separate |
Report URI says the real snippet count is likely higher than 188. Optimizely has not published its own number. Do not brief 178 as the vendor census.
Technical context
High-level, defensive only. Not a reproduction.
ATT&CK mapping for defender queries, not a playbook: T1195.002 Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain, T1059.007 Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript, T1185 Browser Session Hijacking, T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie, T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application (the signup-flow hole, as the vendor described it — no CVE, no KEV row).
Detection that does not require the payload: a new script or connect host 1688360.cc; iOS routers 5vobauua3ojpklx.icu and eil786npto9u5bq.icu; injector webshell.lol; globals window._k7 / window.__k7b; Project JS diffs that add atob( or an unexpected remote script; CSP reports for those hosts. Report URI’s track.js SHA-256 values (17:13 and 17:57 UTC builds) are in its IOC table for matching archived snippets, not as a hash hunt on the CDN today — the files were cleaned.
Public PoCs, kit mirrors, and the injected loader are untrusted input. They are not required to contain.
Threat / exploitation status
| Claim | Status | Confidence |
|---|---|---|
| Unauthorized party wrote JS into some Optimizely Web customer projects on 16 Nov | CONFIRMED (vendor status + Report URI samples + BleepingComputer urlscan) | High |
| Hole was in the Experimentation account signup flow | CONFIRMED as vendor statement to BleepingComputer; technical RCA unpublished | High for the statement; UNKNOWN for the actual bug class |
| 188 snippets / 178 orgs in Report URI’s 1,611-snippet crawl | CONFIRMED as that crawl | High for the sample; real population UNKNOWN (likely higher) |
| All 188 clean by 16 Nov 23:11 UTC | CONFIRMED as Report URI observation | High for that set |
| Crypto actually moved to kit wallets (~$7,150; wallets emptied 17 Nov) | CONFIRMED on-chain; ASSESSED that some of it is this campaign (TRON wallet older) | High for receipts; moderate that all of it is 16 Nov visitors |
| Card / cookie / screenshot volume | UNKNOWN — collector is down (1688360.cc clientHold 17 Nov 00:37 UTC) | — |
| Successful iOS implant | UNKNOWN / not claimed | — |
| Named APT / nation-state | No evidence in these sources | Do not invent |
| Same operation as Amazon MadPot LiteLLM, Storm-3358, Barracuda vendor-key IR | No evidence they are one operation | High they are separate queues |
| CISA KEV add overnight; CVE for Optimizely | No — catalog still 2026.11.13 / 1781 | High |
| OT/ICS process impact | UNKNOWN / not claimed | Honeywell Home / Fluke / Vaillant rows are websites |
| Ransomware use | UNKNOWN / not claimed | — |
What defenders should do
- Inventory Optimizely Web before you trust a missing notice. Every property that loads a snippet from
cdn.optimizely.comor a first-party alias. Open Project JavaScript and every experiment’s custom code. Look for1688360.cc,atob(,webshell.lol, and any script the marketing team did not write. Optimizely says it notified affected customers. Silence is not a green row for a snippet you have not opened.
- Rotate the control plane, then the sessions. Optimizely users, SSO, API tokens, integrations. Then any session cookie that was not
HttpOnlyon an infected property on the 16th. Salesforce’s precaution (disable the snippet) is containment for those properties, not a substitute for token rotation.
- Treat 16 November first-party checkout as a PCI question. Cards in hosted iframes were out of reach. Cards in your form fields were not. Watch issuer alerts; do not wait for Optimizely to publish a card count it cannot have.
- Put a CSP on that survives a trusted snippet going bad. Restrict
connect-src. Do not rely on allowlistingcdn.optimizely.com.'strict-dynamic'trusts whatever the snippet inserts.'unsafe-eval'is how the inline fallback ran at HSBC. Report-only CSP would have been enough to see1688360.cc; enforcement is what blocked 24 of 256.
- Block the collector set and keep the other clocks.
1688360.cc,webshell.lol,5vobauua3ojpklx.icu,eil786npto9u5bq.icu, and the fallback.icuhosts in Report URI’s table. iPhone helpdesk: 18.7.3+ or 26.3+. Separate tickets, still live: N-central HF3 (server and Agents/Probes); Barracuda XDR integration rotation if they mailed you; [SonicWall CVE-2026-19868](/posts/2026-11-07-sonicwall-cve-2026-19868-kev/) due 20 November; Outlook CVE-2026-124194 and Chromium CVE-2026-125350 due 24 November. [Check Point 123039](/posts/2026-11-14-checkpoint-cve-2026-123039-kev/) / UnrealIRCd 114713 were due 16 November — forensic triage Yes, ransomware use Unknown.
RWP assessment
Score 9.2. It outranks N-central HF3 (material patch on a story already on this site 13 November), Barracuda’s ARTEX cloud IR (class already yesterday’s Daily Top; one vendor’s 44-hour walk), GTIG’s exploit_agent paper (16 November, no product CVE, no visitor census), ConnectWise’s ScreenConnect close-out (12 November ticket), and a second day on Check Point 123039 (catalog unchanged, due date already published).
The material development is not “Magecart exists.” It is a trusted experimentation CDN serving a multi-purpose kit to visitors of some of the most visited properties on the internet, vendor-confirmed overnight, with a CSP lesson that allowlisting the vendor host was the miss. We will not invent a CVE, a KEV row, a card census, an iPhone implant count, an APT name, or OT process impact. We will not collapse this signup-flow hole into Amazon’s LiteLLM playbook, Barracuda’s unretired vendor key, or N-central’s Legacy API.
What we are watching
- Optimizely RCA: bug class, how signup-flow write reached unrelated projects, customer count, whether a CVE is assigned.
- Independent IR that finds Project JS persistence after 23:11 UTC 16 November, or a card-issuer census.
- Any KEV row for this hole — none this run.
- N-central HF3 Agent/Probe impersonation hunts; Barracuda XDR key-rotation completion.
- GTIG
exploit_agent/ PaperCut patch-diffing only if a named enterprise victim or a CVE lands. - SonicWall 19868 toward 20 November; Outlook 124194 / Chromium 125350 toward 24 November.
- Cold-chain / Spectrum Power / IoT2050 remain on the OT desk.
Sources
- Optimizely — Web Experimentation Security Incident, status page, 17 Nov 2026 01:02 UTC
- Optimizely — Service Status dashboard (Snippet Delivery monitoring)
- Report URI / Scott Helme — World's Largest Brands Infected With Malware Via Optimizely, 16 Nov 2026 (update 17 Nov 09:17 UTC)
- BleepingComputer — Optimizely hack infected CNN, Fox News, BBC, Salesforce sites with malware, 16 Nov 2026 21:12 ET
- SecurityWeek — Optimizely Vulnerability Exploited to Serve Malware on Major Websites, 17 Nov 2026
- CISA — KEV JSON feed catalog 2026.11.13
- CISA — Adds Two Known Exploited Vulnerabilities to Catalog, 13 Nov 2026
- Barracuda — Forty-four hours: Anatomy of a machine-speed intrusion, 11 Nov 2026
- Barracuda Trust Center — Barracuda XDR Integration Credentials, updated 13 Nov 2026
- N-able Status — N-central 2026.4 HF3 Release Notes, 16 Nov 2026
- RWP Ventures — Amazon MadPot ARTEX LiteLLM Daily Top 2026-11-16
- RWP Ventures — N-central 4EverAble2Shell Daily Top 2026-11-13
- RWP Ventures — Barracuda ESG KEV Daily Top 2026-11-11
- RWP Ventures — Check Point DynamicCLI KEV Daily Top 2026-11-14
- RWP Ventures — ScreenConnect RMM+ Daily Top 2026-11-12