RMM+ accepted blank. Disabling the extension is not the hunt.
Huntress counted 288 hosts across 48 organizations in 90 minutes starting 17:47 UTC 11 November. ConnectWise disabled five RMM+ family extensions across about 400 partner environments. Presence is not compromise. 26.6.5 closed CVE-2026-84869. This campaign ran on 26.6.6.9747 and 26.7.6.9783.
Bottom line up front
CONFIRMED Starting at approximately 17:47 UTC on 11 November 2026, Huntress observed an operator using Run Command on cloud-hosted ScreenConnect panels to push attacker-controlled ScreenConnect clients and a toolkit Huntress calls SCKit onto managed endpoints. Huntress’s published census: 288 hosts across 48 organizations in about 90 minutes, roughly one third in the first ten minutes. Huntress also reported six compromised MSPs as the campaign opened; those numbers were still climbing in the first public notes. ConnectWise published a Trust Center advisory at 22:45 UTC on 11 November and updated it at 02:45 UTC on 12 November. Status: investigation ongoing.
Do not collapse five facts.
- This is not [CVE-2026-84869](/posts/2026-09-14-screenconnect-cve-2026-84869-kev/). That September KEV row was a client file-transfer/execute condition in an active Support or Access session. The floor was 26.6.5, then a host-client reinstall. Huntress says the most current builds in this incident — 26.6.6.9747 and 26.7.6.9783 — are affected. A 26.6.5 ticket is last quarter’s close, not this one.
- ConnectWise says it has found no evidence of a compromise of ConnectWise infrastructure and no vulnerability in ScreenConnect itself. The vendor’s initial assessment is abuse of independent third-party extensions partners installed. Initial access method and full scope remain under investigation. Huntress’s 11:34 p.m. ET update ties the observed commands to RMM+ versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32: the extension authenticates API calls with a shared access key, not ScreenConnect users, roles, or MFA, and those two builds accepted a blank key when an administrator had never set one. Huntress: commands reached endpoints in minutes, no corresponding login, logs reviewed were linked to RMM+. Treat that as ASSESSED by Huntress, not as a CVE and not as ConnectWise’s completed root-cause statement.
- Disabling the extension is containment, not the hunt. ConnectWise disabled five RMM+ family extensions — Labtech Plus, RMM Plus, RMM+, RMM Plus Password Link, RMM+ Password Link — in approximately 400 partner environments wherever it can act. Presence of those extensions does not establish compromise. On-prem partners must disable them themselves. ConnectWise’s own sentence: disabling extensions and resetting credentials alone may not remove unauthorized software, persistence, or access already on endpoints.
- Do not triage the host over ScreenConnect. Huntress reconstructed kit logic designed to wait for a technician connection, steal a
.aspxauthsession cookie, and fan out through Shared Toolbox. Huntress has not observed a successful jump from an infected endpoint to a technician workstation, or from that workstation to other endpoints, in recovered host logs. The console-takeover attempt failed in every recovered log Huntress checked. The observed deployments were console Run Command, not verified autonomous worming. The operator instruction is still: do not connect. Isolation without removing TrapWatch has been observed to reinfect when isolation lifts. - This is not on KEV, and it is not SkyKick, Able2Shell, or Barracuda. Live catalog this run:
2026.11.10/ 1779,dateReleased2026-11-10T19:03:29Z. No new CISA add overnight. [SSHole four-pack](/posts/2026-11-10-sshole-four-kev/) is due today, 12 November, forensic triage Yes. [Barracuda ESG CVE-2026-116606 / CVE-2026-111560](/posts/2026-11-11-barracuda-esg-kev/) and Ivanti CVE-2026-118527 are due tomorrow, 13 November. [SkyKick](/posts/2026-10-17-connectwise-skykick-m365-oauth/) was a publisher-secret / Graph-token incident in a different ConnectWise product. N-able Able2Shell is a different RMM.
The operator sentence: if you run ScreenConnect, the floor today is disable the five extensions, hunt Run Command and Toolbox history and a second client, and do not open an interactive session to a suspect host. 400 is the extension census. 288 is Huntress’s host census. Neither is a green row.
What happened
11 November 2026, after yesterday’s 06:00 ET Daily Top. Huntress’s SOC posted that it was working an active campaign against cloud-hosted ScreenConnect instances beginning around 17:47 UTC. The first public count was six MSPs and 286+ endpoints across 47 organizations, climbing. The Huntress blog later froze 288 / 48. ConnectWise confirmed unauthorized access to certain partner ScreenConnect environments and unauthorized remote-access software in customer environments, then disabled the five extensions as a precaution. Broadcom’s protection bulletin independently restates Huntress and Sophos observing the same pattern: nearly 300 endpoints at 48 organizations, serviced by six MSPs, in about an hour and a half, no particular sector or region singled out.
The on-host chain, as Huntress wrote it — high-level and defensive, not a reproduction. An operator used the panel Run Command feature against groups of sessions, running as SYSTEM. The command checked for an existing ScreenConnect client, pulled an attacker installer to C:\Windows\TEMP\sc.msi, installed it silently, and wrote a dropper under %TEMP% (sckit-run.bat). That dropper fetched a decoder and a host-specific encrypted kit keyed to the machine’s UUID. Subsequent components: Defender exclusions, a second attacker-controlled ScreenConnect client, a directory at C:\ProgramData\RelayTrap\, a scheduled task named TrapWatch running as SYSTEM (Huntress: every 10 seconds), and a compiled RelayTrap.exe that impersonates the legitimate client on the partner’s own relay. The legitimate ScreenConnect service is stopped and set to manual. Huntress notes hashes are weak here: scripts are rebuilt with different embedded values and the trap binary is compiled on each host.
What the kit is built to do next is not what Huntress has confirmed happened. Code review describes a reverse pivot: wait for a technician, file-transfer a dropper with Run, steal .aspxauth, replay against the panel, upload to Shared Toolbox, broadcast, delete the toolbox item about 60 seconds later. Huntress: that method has not been observed to spread successfully. Do not write “the worm jumped every technician” as a confirmed fact. Do not skip the “do not connect” control because the hop failed in the logs recovered so far.
RMM+ as Huntress assessed it. The extension is a third-party add-on that lets another tool drive ScreenConnect sessions without a technician in the console. Huntress: most RMM+ installs it encountered were legitimate leftovers from a project. Versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32 stored RMMPlus.AccessKey with an empty default; the description told the admin to set a strong key; an empty value was not rejected. That bypasses ScreenConnect accounts, roles, and MFA. ConnectWise still describes the API as protected by a partner-configured passphrase and has not published a CVE. Spike Brandt of Huntress told BleepingComputer the activity appears to be abuse of legitimate functionality with custom tooling compiled on the fly, and Huntress had no information on a “patient zero” machine at that interview. Sequential attacker-assigned tags, Huntress told BleepingComputer, suggest other MSPs may have been hit earlier — check Run Command history even without an alert.
Earlier use of one client ID is a separate, unresolved thread. BleepingComputer found a July 2026 batch script on VirusTotal that searches for rogue client ID ed630cc2c873b091 and pulls installers from cdn007-digitaldownloads[.]com, a domain Huntress lists. Huntress declined to comment on that specific July sample and said RMM-as-payload volume is up in 2026. Relationship to 11 November: UNKNOWN. Do not back-date this campaign to July on that ID alone.
Not this increment as a reprint. CISA ICS: newest advisory remains 3 November (ICSA-26-307-01 Subnet Solutions PowerSYSTEM Center). Catalog freeze is still 2026.11.10 / 1779. Apache HTTP Server 2.4.71 (11 November) closed CVE-2026-119618, Apache-rated critical heap corruption / RCE in mod_http2 assign_headers() on 2.4.55 through 2.4.70. Red Hat scores CVSS 3.1 9.8 and says public research has demonstrated a reliable exploit against a default server with mod_http2 enabled; Wiz the same day said no public exploit and no in-the-wild report. Not on this KEV snapshot. Node.js 22.23.5 / 24.22.3 / 26.13.1 (11 November) closed 16 issues including HTTPS heap disclosure CVE-2026-123864. Also not KEV. Those are watch items. They are not 288 managed endpoints in 90 minutes.
Why it matters
Three operational reasons this is the daily.
First: the blast radius is the MSP panel, not a single CVE row. Six MSPs and 48 downstream organizations in Huntress telemetry is already a multi-tenant incident. ConnectWise’s 400 is the extension install census, a containment list, not a confirmed-compromise list. Mixing those two numbers is how an on-prem partner with RMM+ leftover from a project skips the TrapWatch hunt, or an MSP without those five extensions skips Run Command history.
Second: the false close is “ConnectWise disabled it” or “we are on 26.6.5.” Cloud extension disable is what ConnectWise can do on hosted instances. On-prem is the partner. Persistence is on the endpoint: second client, TrapWatch, C:\ProgramData\RelayTrap\, Defender exclusions, SRP/AppLocker rules that can even block powershell.exe. Huntress: isolation without cleanup has reinfected. Connecting to “just check” is the designed next hop even if that hop has not yet been seen to succeed.
Third: yesterday’s KEV clocks are still live and they are not substitutes. SSHole, GPUStack, FreeSWITCH, and Aspera are due today. Barracuda ESG and Ivanti Connect Secure CVE-2026-118527 are due tomorrow. An MSP that spends the morning only on ScreenConnect and misses a musl sshd restart, or tickets ScreenConnect as the Barracuda close, has sequenced the wrong asset.
This is not confirmed OT or ICS process impact. An MSP whose customers include a water utility, a hospital, or a plant is still an IT/RMM compromise of Windows endpoints and a support panel until someone shows the same host writing a controller. Do not promote 288 hosts into a process event.
Who / what is affected
| Asset | What the sources say | Floor / action | Who should care first |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cloud-hosted ScreenConnect | Huntress: campaign used cloud panels; ConnectWise acting on hosted extensions | Verify the five extensions are disabled; hunt anyway | MSPs on ConnectWise-hosted ScreenConnect |
| On-prem ScreenConnect | ConnectWise cannot disable extensions for you | Disable Labtech Plus / RMM Plus / RMM+ / password-link variants now; do not re-enable | On-prem partners; this is the gap |
| RMM+ 1.0.31 / 1.0.32 | Huntress: blank RMMPlus.AccessKey accepted | Leave disabled; Huntress: most installs were leftover legitimate projects | Anyone who ever installed RMM+ for a one-off |
| Managed endpoints | Huntress 288 / 48; second client IDs 2588ef5c15954b10, ed630cc2c873b091 | Hunt second client, TrapWatch, C:\ProgramData\RelayTrap\ | Every customer of an affected MSP |
| Technician workstations | Designed reverse pivot; not observed successful in recovered logs | Treat any tech who did connect to a suspect host as exposed until checked from a clean device | Service desks; do not “just RDP in via ScreenConnect” |
| ScreenConnect 26.6.5 | Closed CVE-2026-84869 | Not this campaign’s close; 26.6.6.9747 and 26.7.6.9783 were in the incident | Anyone still treating September’s KEV as the live ticket |
| Not this row | SkyKick / Cloud Backup; Able2Shell / N-central; Barracuda ESG; SSHole | Follow those vendors | Separate queues |
No public internet-census of exposed ScreenConnect admin UIs is in these sources. Treat exposure as an inventory problem.
Technical context
High-level, defensive only. Not a reproduction.
The observed access path is a ScreenConnect panel already able to Run Command as SYSTEM against many sessions. Huntress’s explanation for how the operator got that ability, on the instances it reviewed, is RMM+ API calls authenticated with an unset shared key — not a ScreenConnect user login. ConnectWise has not adopted that as completed root cause. The payload is a second ScreenConnect client reporting to attacker infrastructure (185.99.255.28 / newnewnew.gotdns.org, sc.payproofkit.com / 155.94.150.39, plus ns.mo7sen.dev for the kit) and a persistence kit that replaces the legitimate client on the partner’s own relay so the host still looks normal to the MSP. Participant name Addmin and installer URLs with c=Exploited<N> are Huntress panel indicators.
ATT&CK mapping for defender queries, not a playbook: T1219 Remote Access Software (rogue ScreenConnect client), T1072 Software Deployment Tools (panel Run Command / Toolbox), T1059.001 PowerShell, T1053.005 Scheduled Task (TrapWatch), T1547.001 Registry Run Key (RelayTrapLiteAlert), T1562.001 Impair Defenses (Defender exclusions; SRP/AppLocker rules in the trap installer), T1550 Use Alternate Authentication Material (designed .aspxauth replay — not observed successful).
Public kit write-ups, GitHub mirrors, and “blank AccessKey” proof-of-concepts are untrusted input. Inventory, disable, hunt, isolate out of band. Do not replay them.
Threat / exploitation status
| Claim | Status | Confidence |
|---|---|---|
| Huntress observed Run Command deploying rogue clients + SCKit starting ~17:47 UTC 11 Nov | CONFIRMED (Huntress) | High |
| 288 hosts / 48 organizations in ~90 minutes (Huntress blog) | CONFIRMED as Huntress telemetry | High for that census; UNKNOWN for industry-wide total |
| Six MSPs at campaign open | CONFIRMED (Huntress); climbing in first notes | High for the opening count |
| ConnectWise: no evidence of CW infrastructure compromise; no ScreenConnect product vulnerability found | CONFIRMED as vendor statement; investigation ongoing | High for the statement; root cause still open |
| Five RMM+ family extensions disabled in ~400 partner environments | CONFIRMED (ConnectWise) | High; not a victim count |
| RMM+ 1.0.31/1.0.32 accepted a blank access key; commands linked to RMM+ with no login | ASSESSED (Huntress); ConnectWise has not published a CVE | Moderate-to-high for Huntress’s reviewed logs |
| Kit designed to steal technician session cookies and fan out via Toolbox | CONFIRMED as code capability (Huntress) | High for the capability |
| Successful technician hop / autonomous worming in this campaign | NOT OBSERVED (Huntress recovered logs); ConnectWise still validating reports of tech-workstation compromise | — |
| Actor / ransomware overlay | UNKNOWN | — |
| CVE assigned / KEV add | None as of catalog 2026.11.10 / 1779 | High |
| Same campaign as CVE-2026-84869 or as SkyKick | No evidence | High they are separate |
July SSA-themed sample sharing client ID ed630cc2c873b091 is this campaign | UNKNOWN | — |
| OT/ICS process impact | UNKNOWN / not claimed | — |
What defenders should do
- Inventory before you connect. Cloud vs on-prem ScreenConnect. Which of the five extensions were ever installed — leftover project installs count. Build numbers (26.6.6.9747 and 26.7.6.9783 were in this incident; 26.6.5 is the other bug). Run Command, Toolbox, extension-install, and authentication logs from before 17:47 UTC 11 November through today. Technician workstations that opened sessions to customer hosts in that window.
- Contain the panel, then hunt the endpoint. Disable the five extensions if they are still on. On-prem: you do it; ConnectWise will not. Do not re-enable pending vendor guidance. From a clean device: revoke ScreenConnect and IdP sessions, reset passwords, enforce MFA, remove unknown users and unexpected roles. That is access hygiene. It does not uninstall TrapWatch.
- Do not use ScreenConnect to triage a suspect host. Use EDR live response, WinRM, or another out-of-band channel. If a technician already connected, treat that workstation as potentially exposed and investigate it from a different clean device. Huntress isolated affected hosts it could see; isolation blocks the attacker’s remote access and the kit’s callbacks — it does not remove the kit.
- Hunt the artifacts Huntress and ConnectWise named, then assume they will change. Second ScreenConnect client IDs
2588ef5c15954b10anded630cc2c873b091. Participant Addmin. Installer path/Bin/ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.msiwithc=Exploited. Scheduled task TrapWatch.C:\ProgramData\RelayTrap\.%TEMP%\sckit-*.RelayTrapLiteAlertunderHKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run. Network:185.99.255.28,155.94.150.39,newnewnew.gotdns.org,soxnewwork.homedns.org,sc.payproofkit.com,ns.mo7sen.dev,cdn007-digitaldownloads.com. Hashes are weak; Huntress published them as supplementary. Unexpected mass Run Command or Toolbox items you did not issue. Legitimate ScreenConnect service stopped or set to manual. Confirm the legitimate client before you delete anything that looks like ScreenConnect. - Keep the other clocks. [SSHole CVE-2026-123158](/posts/2026-11-10-sshole-four-kev/), GPUStack CVE-2026-102895, FreeSWITCH CVE-2026-116779, Aspera CVE-2026-123218: federal due today, forensic triage Yes. [Barracuda 116606/111560](/posts/2026-11-11-barracuda-esg-kev/) and Ivanti CVE-2026-118527: tomorrow. Apache 2.4.71 for HTTP/2-enabled httpd 2.4.55–2.4.70 (CVE-2026-119618) is a parallel patch queue, not this incident. Do not publish or replay RMM+ or SCKit payloads.
RWP assessment
Score 9.3. It outranks Apache CVE-2026-119618 (critical mod_http2 RCE, 2.4.71 out 11 November, Red Hat 9.8 and a REPORTED reliable public exploit against default HTTP/2; not KEV, no confirmed in-the-wild by Apache or CISA), Node.js CVE-2026-123864 (HTTPS heap disclosure including TLS key material as a stated impact; 16 CVEs; not KEV), the SSHole four-pack due today (already [10 November’s Daily Top](/posts/2026-11-10-sshole-four-kev/)), and [yesterday’s Barracuda pair](/posts/2026-11-11-barracuda-esg-kev/) (due tomorrow; no overnight catalog move).
The material development is not “ScreenConnect was exploited again.” It is a new 11 November campaign that ran on current builds, used the panel as the deployment tool, has a Huntress victim census measured in hours, and a vendor containment action (400 extension disables) that the vendor itself says is not remediation. September’s CVE-2026-84869 / 26.6.5 is background and a false close. Huntress’s blank-key assessment is the best current explanation for the instances it reviewed. ConnectWise has not closed root cause. We will not invent a CVE, an actor, or a successful technician worm.
What we are watching
- Whether ConnectWise or a CNA assigns a CVE to RMM+ 1.0.31/1.0.32, or ConnectWise revises the “no product vulnerability” sentence.
- Whether Huntress or another primary source confirms a successful technician hop or Toolbox fan-out, which would change the containment model.
- Whether the 288 / 48 census grows past Huntress’s fleet, or sequential
Exploited<N>tags name MSPs that never got an alert. - Any CISA KEV add, ransomware overlay, or named actor.
- Relationship, if any, between client ID
ed630cc2c873b091/cdn007-digitaldownloads.comand the July SSA-themed sample. - SSHole Thursday closeouts that restart
sshd, not only package the binary; Barracuda Friday forensic triage that hunts restores, not only firmware. - Apache CVE-2026-119618 moving from “public research / no in-the-wild” to KEV.
- New CISA ICS advisories (none in the 11–12 November window we opened; last CISA ICS row remains 3 November).
Sources
- ConnectWise — ScreenConnect security advisory, latest update 12 Nov 2026 02:45 UTC
- Huntress — SCKit Worm Installs Rogue ScreenConnect Clients and Session Cookie Relays Across Hundreds of Endpoints, 11 Nov 2026
- Huntress Support — 2026 November ScreenConnect
- BleepingComputer — Active ScreenConnect attacks breach MSPs, impact dozens of organizations, 11 Nov 2026
- SecurityWeek — Hackers Deploy Malware in Fresh ScreenConnect Campaign, 12 Nov 2026
- Broadcom — Rogue ScreenConnect Clients Hit MSP Customers, 11 Nov 2026
- CISA — Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog
- CISA — KEV JSON feed catalog 2026.11.10
- Apache HTTP Server Project — 2.4 vulnerabilities, CVE-2026-119618 fixed in 2.4.71
- RWP Ventures — ScreenConnect CVE-2026-84869 Daily Top 2026-09-14
- RWP Ventures — Barracuda ESG KEV Daily Top 2026-11-11
- RWP Ventures — SSHole four-pack KEV Daily Top 2026-11-10
- RWP Ventures — ConnectWise SkyKick Daily Top 2026-10-17